Civil Rights and Suffrage: Myra Bradwell\u27s Struggle for the Equal Citizenship for Women by Ruffine, Louisa S.
Hastings Women’s Law Journal
Volume 4 | Number 2 Article 2
6-1-1993
Civil Rights and Suffrage: Myra Bradwell's Struggle
for the Equal Citizenship for Women
Louisa S. Ruffine
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Women’s Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Louisa S. Ruffine, Civil Rights and Suffrage: Myra Bradwell's Struggle for the Equal Citizenship for Women , 4 Hastings Women's L.J. 175
(1993).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj/vol4/iss2/2
Civil Rights and Suffrage: Myra Bradwell's 
Struggle for the Equal Citizenship for Women 
by Louisa S. Ruffine * 
After the Civil War, while the nation debated the range of rights which 
would be secured to the freedmen, the women's rights movement worked 
to insure that women would also receive equal rights, particularly the right 
to vote. When the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments did not 
enfranchise women, many women who had fought against slavery and for 
universal suffrage felt betrayed. The Republican Party's refusal to include 
women's rights in the party platform deepened the sense of betrayal and 
forced suffragists I to take up their cause for equal rights of citizenship 
separately from the freedmen.2 Two inequities in particular animated 
women's rights activists' fight: married women's civil death in marriage, 
and all women's lack of political rights. 
This article will analyze Myra Bradwell's struggle for equal citizenship 
within the nineteenth century women's rights framework. In her life and 
her writing, Bradwell fought for and gained some of the women's rights 
movement's most sought after reforms. Today, Bradwell is known 
* J.D., M.A., University of Virginia, 1992; currently practicing law with Gordon, 
Altman, Butowsky, Weitzen, Shalov & Wein in New York, New York. The author wishes 
to thank Professor Cindy Aron and Professor Charles McCurdy. 
1. For convenience, this article uses the tenn "suffragists" interchangeably with 
"women's rights activists" to describe women who worked for equal rights for wom-
en-most importantly suffrage. This is a simplification of a complex movement, but this 
article takes the basis of the movement at this time to be the National Women Suffrage 
Association and later the National American Woman Suffrage Association. 
2. Ellen Carol Dubois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman 
Suffrage. and the United States Constitution, 1820-1878,74 J. AM. HIST. 836, 837 (1987) 
[hereinafter Compact of the Fathers]. Dubois emphasizes that women, betrayed by the 
abolitionists, even turned to racist tactics to appeal to segments of the male electorate. They 
stopped supporting the Republican party and began to seek allies in the Democratic party. 
Toward that end, suffragists argued that if the lowly negro had the vote, then certainly 
higher born white women should have it. See, e.g., ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND 
SUFFRAGE 79-104 (1978) (discussing the suffragist alliance with racists in the Democratic 
party in the Kansas suffrage campaign). 
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primarily for her role in Bradwell v. State,3 the case in which she sought 
admission to the illinois bar. She is also noted for being the publisher of 
lllinois' first legal newspaper, a crusader for married women's property 
rights, and an active participant in the illinois Woman Suffrage movement. 
Previous articles on Bradwell have focused almost exclusively on 
Bradwell's struggle to practice law.4 These articles argue that Bradwell's 
application. to be admitted to the bar is indicative of her vision--of ~ua1 
citizenship. While it is true- tha.CBraaweU's caSe1I[tistrates her struggle for 
equal citizenship, the picture is not complete unless one examines the range 
of Bradwell's work for women's rights. 
Myra Bradwell had a vision of equal citizenship for women which 
encompassed every right of citizenship granted to white men. As an 
influential member of the community, Bradwell was able to work within 
the lllinois political and legal systems to lobby for women's rights. This 
article argues that while Bradwell's battles in the legislature and the courts 
ostensibly focused on equal "civil" rights (married women's right to keep 
their earnings and women's right to practice law), her writing and her 
involvement with the lllinois Woman Suffrage Association reveal that these 
"civil" rights were integral parts of a broader notion of independence which 
would secure to women equal citizenship and the most sought after 
"political" right: the vote. Bradwell had established the goal of breaking 
down each barrier that stood in women's path to equal citizenship. 
Part One of the article provides a brief introduction to the nineteenth 
century women's movement in order to give a background to the political 
context within which Myra Bradwell worked. Part Two discusses Myra 
Bradwell, and tells the stories of two of her most significant reform 
campaigns: to secure for married women the right to retain their own 
earnings, and to secure for all women the right to practice law. Part Three 
of the article places these reforms into the framework of Bradwell's woman 
suffrage position and argues that both of these "civil" rights reforms were 
intended to have a great effect on women's "political" right to vote. 
The paper concludes that Bradwell did not accept the conventional 
nineteenth century distinctions made between "civil" and "political" rights. 
Bradwell, and women like her in the women's rights movement, would not 
meekly "accept" whichever rights the courts or legislatures were willing to 
3. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
4. See, e.g., Nancy T. Gilliam, A Professional Pioneer: Myra Bradwell's Fight to 
Practice Law, 5 LAW & HIST. REv. 105 (1987); Robert M. Spector, Woman Against the 
Law: Myra Bradwell's Struggle for Admission to the Illinois Bar, 68 J. ILL. STATE HIST. 
SOC. 228 (1975); George W. Gale, Myra Bradwell: the First Woman Lawyer, 39 AM. BAR 
ASSN. J. 1080 (1953). See also Charles Corker, Bradwell v. State: Some Reflections 
Prompted by Myra Bradwell's Hard Case that Made "Bad Law", 53 WASH. L. REv. 215 
(1977) (an article which uses Bradwell's case to argue about the Equal Rights Amendment). 
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bestow. She was working toward full rights of citizenship. As the lllinois 
Woman Suffrage Association resolved: 
. . . all facilities for education, and all avenues of remu-
nerative industry should be open to woman, and that no 
legal impediment should be placed in the way of her 
engaging in every department of social, civil, and political 
life} 
Women would not be satisfied until they gained the full rights of 
citizenship guaranteed to men. Conventional distinctions between "civil" 
and "political" rights may have satisfied the needs of white men, but they 
would not satisfy the demands of women's rights activists. 
I. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY WOMEN'S RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 
Individual rights and equality of opportunity for women were the most 
common themes in the early nineteenth century women's rights movement. 
The movement concentrated on the claim that women should be included 
in the citizenship of the United States.6 Women's rights activists were 
greatly influenced by the republican concepts of rights, individualism, and 
equality. These principles had a discrete impact on the way that women's 
rights activists understood themselves and on the way they expressed their 
sense of a woman's proper role in society.7 The women in the movement 
believed in equality and individualism and insisted that women were men's 
equals. As taxpayers and citizens, women were entitled to all the rights of 
citizenship, including an equal voice in the government. 8 As citizens with 
nominal rights, women in the movement sought rights equal to the rights 
guaranteed to full citizens - men. 
Nineteenth century distinctions between "civil" and "political" rights 
thwarted suffragists' ability to attain equal citizenship. While the 
distinctions between which rights were "political" and which rights were 
"civil" were often blurred, the categories could be distinguished in some 
contexts. In the conventional thought of the day, "political" rights included 
the right to vote and the right to sit on a jury.9 "Civil" rights embraced 
5. 1 em. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 20, 1869, at 164. 
6. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIzENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 112 (1989). 
7. DuBois, Compact of the Fathers, supra note 2, at 836-37. 
8. [d. at 841 (quoting the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments). 
9. CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476, 599, 1121 (1866) (arguing that the federal 
government does not have power to enforce political rights in the states, and responses of 
Senator Lyman Trumbull arguing that the Civil Rights Act does not protect political rights 
such as the right to vote). 
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the rights to enforce legal rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to 
acquire, inherit and dispose of property.1O Legislatures and courts were 
more willing to grant rights they viewed as purely "civil" rights and would 
withhold rights which were considered "political." Women's rights 
activists wanted to secure all types of rights, civil and political. 
From the inception of the women's rights movement, its action focused 
en the mGSt important "political" righL __ the right to vote. Suffragists 
considered the denial of the right to vote to be the most egregious of a 
"package" of discrimination which worked to destroy a woman's "confi-
dence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make her 
willing to lead a dependent and abject life."ll Suffrage was a central right 
of citizenship. Suffragists believed that the abilities incumbent in full 
citizenship would empower individual women to assert control over their 
lives. 12 
The scope of the women's rights movement also included the issue of 
a wife's civil subordination to her husband, and a woman's ability to 
control her own life.13 Through the common law of coverture, married 
women were stuck in a system of enforced dependence on men. Coverture 
was based on the legal assumption that husband and wife were one person 
in marriage; married women possessed neither independent minds nor 
independent power. 14 They could not act independently from their 
husbands and could exercise absolutely no control over their property. 15 
Although equity courts often gave women relief by granting them 
power over their own property, this relief was not available to all women, 
only to those who had access to the courtS.16 Equitable relief was also 
10. See, e.g., CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475, 476, 598-600 (1866). [d. at 474 
(Remarks of Senator Trumbull using Blackstonian defmition of civil liberty, "restraints 
introduced by the law should be equal to all, or as much so as the nature of things will 
admit."). But the lines between "political" and "civil" rights were not entirely clear. See, 
e.g., Congo Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1122 (Remarks of Senator Rogers: "The right of 
suffrage is not a natural right. It is a civil right. It is a right derived from the Government 
and municipal law."). See also Alexander Bickel, The Original Understanding of the 
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 17 (1955); Mark Tushnet, The Politics of 
Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles 
Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. RIST. 884, 888 (1987). 
11. KARST, supra note 6, at 112 (quoting the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments). 
12. [d. at 119. 
13. DuBois, Compact of the Fathers, supra note 2, at 842. 
14. LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REpUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN 
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 152-53 (1980). 
15. MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY xv (1986). Single 
women had the same property rights as men. 
16. Giving married women control over their property was known as granting feme sole 
status. Feme sole status bestowed upon married women the right to contract and to control 
their property the same as if they were unmarried women. In most cases, feme sole status 
would be granted to women only if their husbands had abandoned them or were otherwise 
away from home for long periods of time. [d. at 44. 
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insufficient because equitable principles were not enforced consistently in 
the states that did recognize equitable doctrines for women's property, and 
because equity courts were not available in all states. 17 
While the "unity of person" ideal of coverture supposedly strengthened 
family bonds, women in the movement seized on women's civil death in 
marriage as a basis for criticism. 18 They fought for reforms to eradicate 
married women's subordination to their husbands .. Beginnilig irrthe t83trs, 
Married Women's Property Acts gave women the power to control and 
dispose of their own property. 19 In turn, increased control over property 
gave women more power within marriage.20 
It is important to keep in mind that women fighting for equal rights and 
recognition as individuals repeatedly confronted (and continue to confront) 
a double-bind. Men did not want women to be equal, because that would 
bring women up to a male-defined norm-making women like men. On 
the other hand, women who maintained their "femininity" remained 
different, and therefore subordinate.21 Some of the women in the 
17. Puritans, for example, were resistant to chancery, and committed to a desire to 
simplify land law and facilitate the transfer of property. Property law was simpler to 
administer when married women had fewer property rights. Id. at 188. 
18. Id. at 13; DuBois, Compact of the Fathers, supra note 2, at 842. 
19. Although many reasons have been given for the impetus behind the reform of married 
women's property law beginning in the 1830's, that debate is academic. Whether or not 
the enactment of Married Women's Property Acts in different states was the product of the 
codification movement, a result of economic downturn or due to the desire to keep 
spendthrift husbands from their wives' dower rights in property, it is clear that the women 
who worked for the acts saw their passage as vital for obtaining control over their own 
property, and thus, control over their own lives. For a range of theories on the motivations 
behind the Acts, see Richard Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850,71 GEO. 
L.J. 1359 (1983); Linda E. Speth, The Married Women's Property Acts, 1839-1865: Reform, 
Reaction, or Revolution? in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW: A SOCIAL HISTORICAL PERSPECfIVE 
69 (D. Kelly Weisberg, ed., 1982); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
LAW 209-211. See also infra, notes 44 & 123. 
20. SALMON, supra note 15, at xii. Salmon asserts that control over property is an 
important baseline for learning how men and women share power in the family. However, 
another historian. Frances Olsen, argues that while reforms in the law of married women's 
property pronloted equality, they also undermined the altruistic bases of the family and left 
women open to individualistic market struggles which they were ill-equipped to handle after 
years of "protection" under their husband's control. Thus, while the Married Women's 
Property Acts achieved their goal of equal rights for women, the Acts did not make relations 
within the family any more democratic. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and Market: A Study 
of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1532 (1983). 
Alternatively, a commentator in 1887 noted that "[t]he world is conservative in regard to 
granting power to those who have not held it, but of one thing we may be sure, that neither 
the family nor the state will fall to pieces because of granting to a woman equal property 
rights with her husband." M. Fredrika Perry, Property Rights of Married People, 1 Cm. 
LAW TIMEs 187, 195 (1887). 
21. KARsT, supra note 6, at 118. This is a common theme among today's radical 
feminists. See generally CATIIARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE 
STATE (1989). 
180 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:2 
women's rights movement who were most successful in gaining the ear of 
the legislature were effective because they did not appear to threaten men's 
dominance or to be trying to step outside of women's traditional roles. In 
a way, some women's ability to gradually work within the male-constructed 
political world without sacrificing their feminine roles made them more 
effective women's rights advocates. Myra Bradwell is a good example of 
this . type . Of WOman~ Unfortunately, felilininity also detracted from 
women's credibility as deserving of equal rights. For example, while 
Bradwell could work effectively within the system to improve women's 
status, this article illustrates that the establishment honored her especially 
for upholding traditional women's roles. 
II. MYRA BRADWELL AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY 
A. A SHORT BIOGRAPHY 
Myra Bradwell was born Myra Colby in Manchester, Vermont on 
February 12, 1831.22 From Vermont, her family moved briefly to New 
York. In 1843, they settled in Elgin (Cook County), lllinois where Myra 
Colby attended public school. She later attended a Ladies' Seminary in 
Kenosha, Wisconsin. In 1852, Myra Colby married James Bradwell, and 
moved with him to Memphis to teach in a private school where he was the 
principal. When the Bradwells returned to Chicago in 1855, James was 
admitted to the local bar where he began a long and distinguished legal 
career. After practicing law for a few years, he became a county court 
probate judge and then a state legislator. The Bradwells had four children, 
two of whom survived to adulthood. 
Mrs. Bradwell's activism in lllinois politics apparently began with her 
involvement in the Sanitary Commission during the Civil War.23 At the 
1865 Sanitary Fair, Bradwell coordinated the Fair's major attraction, the 
booth for the Committee on Arms, Trophies and Curiosities. 24 After the 
war and the disappointment of the Reconstruction amendments, Myra 
22. Biographical information found in Gilliam, supra note 4, at 105. 
23. The organization that became the Sanitary Commission was started in New York by 
Elizabeth Blackwell, the first American woman doctor. In a number of northern states, 
Sanitary Commissions coordinated the efforts of volunteers to help the army medical 
department get supplies to where they were needed on the battlefront. Although men 
organized the Sanitary Commissions, women did the majority of the work. Mter the 
creation, men held the majority of offices within the association, but women ran the 
statewide efforts. See 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 15-17 (Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton, & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., 1881). 
24. ADADE MITCHELL WHEELER & MARLENE STEIN WORTMAN, THE ROADS THEy 
MADE: WOMEN IN ILLINOIs HISTORY 41 (1977). 
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Bradwell and other women from the Sanitary Commission formed a 
statewide network of women interested in the women's rights movement.2S 
On October 3, 1868, Bradwell began publishing the Chicago Legal 
News (hereinafter News), the first paper in lllinois devoted exclusively to 
legal news. The newspaper covered the northwestern legal community by 
publishing the full texts of statutes and reported cases, as well as abstracts 
from rourt opinions . The News also published fl6tes. aboot ·legalreform 
issues, attorney profiles, and news on Chicago lawyers. In the first edition, 
Bradwell wrote, "[inJ presenting to the public the Chicago Legal News, we 
offer no apology and make no promises, except to say that we shall do all 
we can to make it a paper that every lawyer and business man in the north-
west ought to take.,,26 
The distribution of the prospectus for the paper apparently created quite 
a stir. The Chicago Sunday TImes stated, "[I]t would seem to be a novel 
enterprise for a lady, but it is a lady who is going to undertake it.,,27 The 
Grand Rapids Democrat called the newspaper "a valuable acquisition to the 
legal literature of the northwest," and opined, "It is singular that Chicago 
should surrender that field to a lady.,,28 
Within a short period of time, the News became required reading for 
the northwestern legal community.29 In 1873 the Chicago Tribune called 
the paper, "the best law-newspaper in the country.,,30 As the American 
Law Review observed in 1894, "[p Jractical newspapermen and prominent 
lawyers at once predicted its failure, but they underestimated the ability and 
power of the little woman.,,3! 
Bradwell's control of the News was extraordinary for the time. The 
Bradwells had sufficient influence within the legislature to secure approval 
for Bradwell to serve as president of the Chicago Legal News Publishing 
Company without the usual legal disabilities that accompanied married 
women's attempts to enter business.32 Another special legislative act 
25. [d. at 52. The other two women who were instrumental in organizing the statewide 
network were Mary Livermore and Catherine Waite. Both women assumed preeminent 
positions in the Woman Suffrage Movement. 
26. 1 em. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 3, 1868, at 4. 
27. [d. at 7 (quoting em. SUNDAY TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1868). 
28. 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 17, 1868, at 22 (quoting THE DEMOCRAT, Oct. 7, 1868). 
29. 2 em. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. I, 1870, at 109 (quoting a letter from court reporter N.L. 
Freeman: "By the prompt and reliable report of recent cases, you have made the News not 
only desirable, but necessary to every practicing lawyer."). 
30. em. TRm., April 20, 1873, at 8, col. 3. 
31. NOTE, Death of Mrs. Myra Bradwell, 28 AM. L. REv. 278, 279 (1894). 
32. WHEELER, supra note 24, at 52; 1 NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN, 1607-1950, at 224 
(Edward T. James et aI. eds., 1974). illinois at the time adhered to the Common Law of 
Coverture. The Illinois Court had narrowly construed the 1861 Married Women's Property 
Act. The legislature granted Bradwell feme sole status, discussed supra at note 16. This 
status gave her the ability to contract in relationship to the newspaper and to retain all the 
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declared the News a valid source of information for all lllinois laws, and 
acceptable as prima facie evidence of the laws in any court in illinois. 33 
Through her persistence, the News became the "most important [legal 
newspaper] west of the Alleghenies" and was often cited by lawyers for 
both its cases and its commentary.34 
Bradwell assumed an extraordinary amount of influence within the legal 
cOmmUml}i of toe northwest as 1I publisher and· interpreter -afn-laws. 
Through her paper, she exercised "an influence just as powerful as she 
would have in the courts, by virtue of her personal presence and her 
professional erudition.,,3S Bradwell understood the power of her position, 
and obviously intended to make a difference.36 She used the News as a 
forum for all kinds of legal reform issues, particularly the reform of the 
"Law Relating to Women.'>37 
Bradwell was in a particularly good position to exert her influence at 
a most opportune time. The Chicago Legal News commenced publishing 
at a turbulent time in the history of the nation. In 1868 the country was 
undergoing the upheaval of Reconstruction. The passage of the Fifteenth 
Amendment in 1869 led to the development of an independent woman 
suffrage movement. Bradwell circulated the call for the first Woman 
Suffrage Convention in Chicago in February 1869.38 She used her paper 
earnings from it. Bradwell was the fIrst (and probably the only) woman who ever 
specillcally received the right to control her own earnings from the lllinois legislature. 26 
Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 17, 1894, at 202. 
33. Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 17, 1869, at 228. 
34. WHEELER, supra note 24, at 52. See, e.g., Joel Prentiss Bishop, 2 COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN 347 (1873-75). See also Patricia Cain, Feminism and 
the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 816 (1990). 
35. Cm. TRm., Apr. 20, 1873, at 8, col. 3. 
36. 1 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 27, 1869, at 172. In this issue, she invited the 
"gentlemen" of the Illinois Register and the Illinois State Journal to visit the offIces of "the 
Revolution, Agitator and Legal News." By grouping the Legal News with the national and 
illinois woman suffrage newspapers, Bradwell placed her respected mainstream legal 
newspaper in radical company. This seems an emphatic admission that Bradwell knew the 
power her newspaper could have and intended to use her mainstream newspaper to advocate 
iconoclastic causes, even though she had to do it as an outsider, due to her lack of access 
to the courts. 
37. A column by this name fIrst appeared on October 17, 1868. It is likely that this 
column was suggested by Bradwell's friend, Catherine Waite, who was the editor of the 
New Covenant. The New Covenant suggested, "[w]e hope Mrs. Bradwell may add to her 
little weekly another feature which will especially interest her own sex-a brief and clear 
summary . . . of the laws of the various states that bear especially upon women, married and 
single, with a resume of the legal disabilities to which these subject them. . . . Mrs. 
Bradwell can render invaluable aid to women by putting them in possession of knowledge 
of their legal status in their state of residence." 1 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 17, 1868, at 23 
(quoting NEW COVENANT, Oct. 10, 1868). Although the column itself was short-lived, the 
News continued to devote generous space to the law relating to women in its case notes and 
commentary. 
38. 1 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 6, 1869, at 149. 
"', 
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as a forum for supporting such issues as a married women's earnings act, 
woman suffrage, a widow's right to a regular share in her husband's estate, 
and a woman's right to practice law.39 
In her writing, Bradwell made two things clear. First, she personally 
expected to be able to participate in society on the same basis as men and 
to be recognized for her own considerable talents. Second, she wanted all 
women to pat1iciJ)at~ in the Hfe of the nation to the same extent thatmen 
did. 
It is important to keep in mind in reading about her reform successes 
that much of Bradwell's success was due to her connections. Like most 
women of her day, Bradwell had difficulty getting men of the establishment 
to accept her work as an individual without looking at her status as a 
woman. Bradwell had to couch her arguments to avoid overstepping 
women's bounds and offending men's sensibilities. Unlike most women 
of her time, Bradwell had a supportive husband, friends in the legislature, 
and an inftuentiallegal newspaper; all these things helped her gain men's 
ears. 
An examination of the community's reaction to her work reveals that 
Bradwell was never completely successful in escaping the traditional notion 
of the correct behavior for women. Rather, she garnered respect because 
she worked in a man's field and lobbied for women's rights without 
violating society's limits on women.40 
At her death in 1894, the American Law Review observed, 
Mrs. Bradwell was one of those who lived their 
creed instead of preaching it. She did not spend her 
days proclaiming on the rostrum the rights of women 
but quietly, none the less effectively, set to work to 
clear away the barriers.41 
Other observers were impressed by her "quiet self-possession.,,42 The 
Illinois Press Association eulogized, "[s]he had no respect for the platform 
babblers who prated of their 'rights' but who had neither the ability nor 
inclination to really do something for their sex."43 
39. See generally Dubois, Compact of the Fathers, supra note 2, and DUBOIS, FEMINISM 
AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 2. See also SALMON, supra note IS, and infra notes 45-75. One 
commentator mentioned that "perhaps ... too large a space is devoted to the rights of 
wives," but the publication "show[ed] no mean ability; and, above all, it shows good, hard, 
honest, useful work." BOOK NOTICE, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, 3 AM. L. REv. 362 (Jan. 1, 1869). 
40. Spector, supra note 4, at 228. 
41. Death of Mrs. Myra Bradwell, supra note 31, at 282. This was taken (without 
citation) from the obituary in 26 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 17, 1894, at 202. 
42. 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, May 15, 1869, at 274 (quoting THE WESTERN JURIST). 
43. 26 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 24, 1894, at 210 (quoting the ILL. PREss ASS'N 
MEMORIAL). 
184 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:2 
The American Law Review previously had reviewed the News and 
Bradwell's work: 
She has begun at the right end: and we commend her 
example to those Eastern women who so volubly proclaim 
that they are the equals of men: let them prove it, as their 
Western sister has done; let them tum to, and show that 
they, too,ucan-dlYa man's work.4<1 
All these comments ignored the fact that Bradwell could remain quietly 
effective because of her ability to work within the system. She worked so 
that other women could become part of the system as well. The "platform 
babblers" took to their platforms because they had no friends in the 
legislature. Bradwell did not have to proclaim "on the rostrum." She had 
a respected forum in her newspaper, and friends in the legislature who 
would listen. 
Without the work Bradwell did for women's rights, it would not have 
been easy for other women to accept the American Law Review's challenge 
to do a man's work. It was unmistakable that every step Bradwell took for 
women's rights had one goal in rnind--equal citizenship for all women, 
including full political participation. Only when all women had equal 
citizenship would they have the same ability to do the work that Myra 
Bradwell had. 
B. MARRIED WOMEN'S EARNINGS 
In the third issue of the News, Bradwell began a campaign for the 
passage of an act to insure that married women could retain control over 
their own earnings.45 Bradwell's campaign began as a reaction to the 
narrow reading that had been given to the 1861 lllinois Married Women's 
Property Act.46 By judicial construction, the 1861 Act covered only real 
44. BOOK NOTICE, supra note 39, at 364. 
45. 1 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 17, 1868, at 45. The first act giving women control over 
their earnings was passed in Massachusetts in 1855. Richard Chused refers to the Married 
Women's Earnings Acts as the "third wave" of Married Women's Property Acts. Chused, 
supra note 19, at 1398. The first group of statutes, passed almost entirely in the 1840's, 
dealt with freeing married women's estates from the debts of their husbands. The second 
wave established separate estates for married women. 
46. Although it was only mentioned briefly, supra note 19, the events surrounding the 
passage of the Illinois Married Women's Property Act bolster the argument that the 
women's movement was a major force in the passage of Married Women's Property Acts 
generally. The Married Women's Property Act apparently passed without being much of 
an issue in the Illinois House of Representatives or the Senate. In the winter of 1860, 
Hannah Tracy Cutler, M.D., a homeopathic doctor, and Mrs. Frances D. Gage made a 
canvass of the interior and western parts of Illinois collecting signatures to petitions asking 
for women's equality before the law, especially for the right of married women to earn, hold 
and dispose of the property the same as a feme sole. According to Cutler's narrative in 
HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, when she returned from Ohio no action had been taken 
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and personal property, not married women's earnings or any of the property 
purchased with those earningS.47 The illinois courts' construction of the 
1861 Act was consistent with the common law of married women's 
earnings. Under the common law, unless a man allowed his wife to keep 
her earnings as separate property, they became his.48 The first pUblication 
of the "Law Relating to Women" column announced, "Earnings of A 
Married Wmnan Not Within J\.<;t of 1861."49 Bradwell iDQUired. "should 
not the Act of 1861 be so amended as to embrace her earnings for labor 
performed outside her own household?,,50 
Bradwell's campaign for the Married Women's Earnings Act (the 
"Act") may be divided into two segments. First, Bradwell lobbied for 
passage of the Act. While she was lobbying for its passage, Bradwell was 
a shrewd politician. She appealed to legislators to protect the pitiful 
women whose earnings were not under their own control. These arguments 
were consistent with arguments that had been made for early Married 
Women's Property Acts in other states, but did not reveal the true intention 
behind Bradwell's position.51 After the Act passed, Bradwell advocated 
its broad construction. This portion of her campaign reveals Bradwell's 
individual rights arguments and the centrality of property rights for her 
definitions of citizenship and eqUality. 
on the petition, so she approached the legislator who was supposed to handle the issue. 
When he protested that it was too late in the session, she approached Mr. Pickett, who told 
her to draft a bill giving women, during coverture, certain personal and property rights. 
Pickett presented the petitions, formed a special committee, and then took the bill before 
the full legislature where it passed and became law. 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 561-
62 (Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., 1881). Cutler 
was a resident of Ohio who also conducted and participated in petition drives in New York 
and Ohio. 1 NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN, 1607-1950, supra note 32, at 426-27. The bill 
passed by a vote of 12 to 10 in the Senate and 39 to 28 in the House. ILL. SENATE J., Feb. 
4, 1861, at 249; ILL. HOUSE J., Feb. 20, 1861, at 860. An act that the House considered 
which would have "secure[d] to married women their property and earnings and other 
rights" was reported back to the House together with certain petitions and recommended 
reference to the select committee. ILL. HOUSE J., Feb. 7, 1861 at 394. The version 
eventually passed in the House was the version considered by the Senate which made no 
mention of "earnings and other rights." Taking a failure to act as intent, this means that 
earnings were not meant to be included in the Act-they were viewed as different than 
property. The Act was codified at Statutes of Ill. ch. 69a § 2 (Gross 1871). 
47. 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 17, 1868, at 22. 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 13, 1869, at 
53. 
48. Joel Prentiss Bishop, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN § 21 
(William S. Hein ed., 1987) (1873-75). Moreover, even if he gave her permission to keep 
her earnings separately, if he changed his mind at any time, her earnings became his. 
Salmon, supra note 15, at 57. 
49. 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 17, 1868, at 22. 
50. Id. 
51. See generally Chused, supra note 19. 
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It may be assumed from examining the arguments when she lobbied for 
passage of the Married Women's Earnings Act that Bradwell knew the 
audience to whom her arguments were addressed. She couched her claims 
in terms that would be acceptable, and persuasive, to the lliinois Legislature 
and to the powerful men who read the News. During this first stage, 
Bradwell appealed to the legislature to amend the 1861 Act to protect 
women from"~ shoddy creditors" taking the wife's earnings to pay the 
husband's debts.s2 She gave as an example a case in which the wages of 
the wife of a "drunken, spendthrift" husband were garnished to pay his bar 
tab. From this case, she argued that giving the woman control over her 
earnings would save the wife and children from want by placing the wife's 
earnings beyond the creditor's reach.s3 
In another issue, Bradwell called the attention of her readers to a case 
involving a woman in Chicago who owned her own store, "worked like a 
slave," and now found that her store was subject to a mechanics' lien 
against her husband because the leasehold was purchased with the wife's 
earnings while she was married. 54 Bradwell pointed out that the woman 
had run the store by herself and was a successful, wholly responsible 
businesswoman. Bradwell solicited her readers' sympathy. It was 
inequitable for this woman's hard work to go to paying her husband's 
debts. She wrote, "we call the attention of the members of the Legislature 
to the law of 1861, and ask them to amend it so that a married woman may 
be entitled to her own earnings. ,,55 
Although Bradwell stayed with sympathy appeals during the first stage 
of her involvement with the Married Women's Earnings Act, in some 
places it appeared that the rights guaranteed by the Act were either the 
means to achieving or symbolic of a larger goal. For example, in one issue 
Bradwell published a letter which purportedly rejected giving married 
women the absolute right to their earnings.56 Actually, the letter presented 
another women's rights position. The reader wrote that Bradwell's reform 
theory for protecting helpless women ignored another truth of marriage. 
He agreed that a married woman's property should be safe from her 
husband's capricious disposal. The reader saw trouble arising when 
creditors could not get to the wife's property and the husband had none; the 
husband and wife colluded to deprive the creditor of the money he was 
entitled to. The wife received food, clothing and other things from credit, 
but the creditor could not reach the wife's property. The reader argued that 
52. 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 31, 1868, at 37. 
53. 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 17, 1868, at 22. 
54. 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 21, 1868, at 60 (citing Schwartz v. Sanders, 46 Ill. 18,24-
25 (Freeman 1867». 
55. [d. 
56. 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 14, 1868, at 53. 
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a married woman's property must be held on a basis equitable and just to 
the husband's creditors.57 
In another letter, the same reader elaborated on his argument. He wrote 
that the 1861 Married Women's Property Act did not meet its goals 
because it was based on one idea of protecting the wife's separate property 
without regard to the effect this might have on other classes of the 
community.58 The reader argued that although the common law was 
unfair to the wife, the statute was unfair to the husband. Bradwell's statute 
would make husband and wife strangers, each having no say in each other's 
property. Unfortunately, because the community at large dealt with the 
husband and wife as a family, all debts for the family were technically the 
husband's. The reader argued that for prevention of fraud, the wife's 
property should be taken to payoff debts incurred for the benefit of the 
family. 59 The wife should contribute to the family to the best of her 
ability. 
Bradwell supported the implications of the reader's statement - that 
women were capable of contributing to the family's support and should be 
permitted to do so. The letter's publication was the first, albeit oblique, 
statement in the News that the Act could have a larger purpose than 
protecting helpless women; women could make a contribution to the family 
outside of the home. 
The idea that women could contribute to the family's support was not 
common in Bradwell's time. In 1869, few white married women were 
working outside the home. Although there are no studies readily available 
for Chicago at this time, as late as 1890 less than five percent of married 
women in the United States were in the workforce.60 Bradwell was 
interested in protecting that small percentage and insuring that these 
women's contributions were recognized and protected. 
During the first stage, Bradwell only published one argument for 
married women's right to control their own earnings which took an 
individual rights stance. She reprinted an article on married women's 
earnings and property from a British magazine: 
57. [d. 
[T]he common law of England on the subject of marriage 
makes a great mistake. It ignores the individuality of 
persons and merges the distinct interests of two human 
58. 1 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 12, 1868, at 85. 
59. [d. 
60. Chused, supra note 19, at 1363 (citing u.s. BUREAU OF TIIE CENsus, THE 
STATISTICAL HISTORY OF TIIE U.S. FROM COLONIAL TIMEs TO TIIE PREsENT 500 (1976)). 
Most women who worked were single. However, Nancy Cott points out that this number 
does not account for women who worked at home. NANCY COlT, THE GROUNDING OF 
MODERN FEMINISM 129 (1987). 
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beings into one interest; that one . . . a complete suppres-
sion of one beneath the otherY 
[Vol. 4:2 
This stated the women's rights position against women's civil death in 
marriage. Bradwell concluded that the arguments from Great Britain 
applied "with equal force in our own state.,,62 
Although Bradwell had begun to lobby the idea of a bill in her third 
issue, she ma not take tbe1mt to the legislature until just after the Woman 
Suffrage Convention in Chicago in February of 1869. At the convention, 
a committee of six, including Judge and Mrs. Bradwell, were appointed to 
go to Springfield to lobby for the bill Bradwell had written to give married 
women a property right to their earnings equivalent to those of married 
men.63 
After the Act passed the Illinois legislature, Bradwell argued that it 
should be interpreted to broaden women's individual rights. She published 
a step-by-step summary of the cases construing the 1861 Act,64 and 
suggested that there were two modes of construing the act of 1861. One 
was according to the Common Law, the other according to the "progressive 
spirit of the age and the intention of the Legislature as plainly expressed in 
the act itself. ,,65 She argued that unity of the husband and wife, so far as 
it related to property, was effectually destroyed by the act of 1861; the 
husband and wife were "no longer one but twO.,,66 What she had only 
hinted at before became absolutely clear at this point: Bradwell meant her 
statute to be construed to give women absolute control over their own 
61. 1 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 16, 1869, at 125. 
62. Id. at 126. 
63. 1 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 20, 1869, at 164; 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 13, 1869, at 
188. Judge Bradwell brought the matter up at the convention. Cm. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1869, 
at 4, col. 3. Myra Bradwell specifically intended the act, entitled "An act to amend an act 
to protect married women in their separate property . . . and to declare the purpose and 
intent of the same," would, first, overturn the narrow common law interpretation, and 
second, declare that the 1861 statute was to be interpreted liberally. The law read: 
Be it enacted ... that a married woman shall be entitled to receive, use, and 
possess her own earnings, and sue for the same in her own name, free from the 
interference of her husband or his creditors; provided, this act shall not be 
construed to give to the wife any right to compensation for any labor performed 
for her minor children or husband. 
Stat. of Ill. ch. 69a § 13 (Gross 1871), 1 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 3, 1869, at 212. 
The bill was read by Mr. Bond and referred to the committee on the judiciary. It 
passed the House unanimously and was sent to the Senate for its approval. ILL. HOUSE J., 
Mar. 4, 1869, at 706. Apparently, the bill faced some small resistance in the Senate. The 
Senate Judiciary Committee recommended passage, but Mr. Fuller, the committee 
spokesman for the bill, voted against it, as did two of his political allies. ILL. SENATE J., 
Mar. 8, 1869, at 364; Mar. 16, 1869, at 585. The governor approved the legislation. ILL. 
SENATE J., Apr. 14, 1869, at 775. 
64. See, e.g., 1 Cill. LEGAL NEWS, July 17, 1869, at 364. 
65. 2 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 27, 1869, at 68. 
66. Id. 
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property and to insure that women maintained autonomy from their 
husbands. 
Bradwell made bolder statements to this effect on other occasions. For 
example, in commenting on a case regarding a wife's ability to hire her 
husband, she wrote: 
[When we drew the bill for earnings,] we aimed a blow at 
tire 1aw effecting the property of married wOmen far 
beyond their earnings, thinking that when the reason for 
making many of these distinctions against the wife should 
be removed, that the distinctions themselves would fall. 
We believe that when this statute is construed by the courts 
it will be found that we were not mistaken.67 
Bradwell understood that an act which provided protection for women 
could be used to keep them in a subordinate role.68 She wanted the Act 
to be interpreted so that women would be treated exactly the same as men 
in regard to their earnings. For example, soon after the Act was passed, 
Bradwell printed a decision interpreting the 1861 Act according to the old 
common law rules.69 This case held that a husband was still liable for the 
debts of his wife contracted before they were married because he was 
entitled to her labor, skill, and earnings.70 Bradwell declared that now 
that the wife was entitled to her own earnings, the husband should be freed 
from paying his wife's debts contracted before marriage.71 If the wife 
was not liable to pay the husband's debts contracted before the marriage, 
the husband should not be liable to pay the wife's debts.72 
67. 1 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, July 10, 1869, at 356. According to Bradwell, the court held 
that under the Married Women's Property Act, a married woman may carry on her business 
on her own account for her own interest, that she may employ all needed labor, workmen 
and agents, and that she may employ her husband and pay him. 
68. See KARsT, supra note 6, at 117 ("women can be hurt by false paternalism and by 
false equality") (quoting Frances Olsen, False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial 
Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1518, 1541 (1986». 
This concept is explored in depth in Olsen's article. See also infra, note 97. 
69. 1 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, July 17, 1869, at 364. In McMurtry v. Webster, 48 m. 123· 
(1868), the court could not apply the new law because the dispute in question took place 
before the new law was passed. 
70. [d. at 124. 
71. 1 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, July 17, 1869, at 364. This bolsters the argument that Bradwell 
could be asserting this right to force absolute equality and the refonn of the workplace so 
that women could work. How could women find true economic independence from their 
husbands if fewer than 5% were working outside the home and they had no right to 
payment for services provided inside the home to their families? 
72. [d. 
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In 1872, the Illinois court construed the 1861 and 1869 acts together 
to hold a woman liable for attorney's fees out of her separate property.73 
The court stated that a woman should bear the burdens of her unsuccessful 
litigation. The court noted, ''the extension of rights usually imposes 
corresponding liabilities. So in this case, holding or having the right to 
hold separate property and earnings, [the wife] must be held liable to costs 
inGurred inmaintaipipg her separate rights.,,74 Bradwell appmVID of this 
case, but would have taken the holding further. She wanted no "protec-
tion" for women, but expected equal treatment: 
Many of the perplexing questions in regard to the property 
rights of married women that now trouble the ablest mem-
bers of the profession, would be satisfactorily settled if our 
supreme court would construe these reformatory acts 
according to the intention of the legislature that passed 
them, and hold that married woman for any contract 
relating to her separate property, might be sued in an 
action at law, and upon judgment going against her, that it 
might be satisfied out of the separate property of her 
earnings.75 
In 1873, the Illinois Supreme Court broadly construed the terms of the 
Married Women's Earnings statute. Bradwell saw the Act's full potential 
realized. The court held that when the legislature gave a woman the right 
to "use and possess the property and earnings, free from the control or 
interference of her husband" it conferred the right to take and possess 
earnings.76 Without the right to labor to acquire earnings, the law 
conferred a barren right.77 The court said that the legislature intended to 
give a woman the right to control her own time, manage her separate 
property and contract with reference to it.78 Coverture was defeated. In 
a bold statement, the court declared, "[the husband's] legal supremacy is 
gone, and the sceptre has departed from him."79 
Bradwell heralded this decision. She wrote in an editorial, "[ w ]hen we 
drew the act of 1869, giving to a married woman her own earnings, it was 
with a view of making the right of husband and wife to labor, hold and 
acquire property, equal before the law."80 This was far bolder than any 
73. 4 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 13, 1872, at 101 (Musgrave v. Musgrave, 54 TIL (Freeman) 
186, 188 (1872». 
74. [d. 
75. 4 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 13, 1872, at 103. 
76. Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129, 130 (Freeman 1873). 
77. [d. 
78. [d. at 132. 
79. [d. at 139. 
80. 5 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 22, 1873, at 306. 
Summer 1993] CIVIL RIGHTS AND SUFFRAGE 191 
statement Bradwell had made when she argued for the Act's passage, but 
obviously the court's broad construction realized Bradwell's goals for the 
Act. 
An examination of other contemporary commentary on the 1873 case 
shows that Bradwell had struck a blow for women's rights under law. In 
his 1875 Commentaries on the Law of Married Women, Joel Prentiss 
Bishop restated the old B1ackstonian view that woman· was net t& be 
separate from man; the unity of the marriage relation forbade it.8) Bishop 
blasted the broad description of Bradwell's Act and supported a more 
constrictive interpretation according to the common law unity of person 
under marriage. He asked, "what shall hinder ... the wife [from leaving] 
her husband's bed and board, and his domicil, in pursuit of richer pastures 
or more golden harvests in fields of labor elsewhere?,,82 Bishop would 
have ignored the spirit behind the statutory reform of the law of Married 
Women in favor of maintaining old common law strictures. Bradwell's Act 
helped divert the Illinois Supreme Court from that path. 
C. THE FIGHT FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 
In the same year that she lobbied the Married Women's Earnings Act, 
Bradwell initiated the next step in her fight for women's rights: her battle 
to be admitted to practice law in the State of Illinois. As the first woman 
to try to gain admission to the bar in Illinois, Bradwell litigated a woman's 
right to practice law through the Illinois Supreme Court up to the United 
States Supreme Court. Although Bradwell's attempt to use the courts to 
gain admission to the bar was unsuccessful, her effort had great effect in 
gaining rights for women in Illinois. In her suit, Bradwell tried to push 
women's rights concerns to their logical conclusion, and to gain more 
ground for women in the process. 
As she revealed in 1873, Bradwell had intended that the Married 
Women's Earnings Act would be construed to give married women the 
equal right under law to labor and to hold and acquire property. 83 In her 
lawsuit to gain admission to the bar, she attempted to test the lliinois 
court's willingness to apply that statute broadly to expand married women's 
rights. Although the lliinois court did not accept her arguments in 1869, 
without Bradwell's work to gain admission to the bar, it is conceivable that 
the court would not have given the Act such a broad interpretation in 
1873.84 
It is not known exactly at what point or for what purpose she 
undertook the study of law, but Bradwell began studying law on her own 
81. Bishop, supra note 48, at 20-22 n. 2. 
82. Id. at 347. 
83. See supra notes 50-51, 56-62 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
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for several years before she applied to the Illinois bar in the summer of 
1869.85 The requirements for admission had been formulated by the 
illinois legislature: 
[N]o person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or 
counselor at law . . . in any court of record within the state 
. . . without having previously obtained a license for that 
purpose from some two of the Justices of the Supreme 
Court ... [which] shall authorize him to appear in all the 
courts of record.86 
Pursuant to the requirements of the statute, Bradwell submitted to the 
illinois Supreme Court a certificate of qualification signed by a circuit 
judge and a state's attorney. A superior court judge examined her and a 
member of the Chicago bar filed a certificate of examination and charac-
ter. 87 Apparently, Bradwell passed a "most creditable" examination.88 
Bradwell knew she would face resistance from the illinois Supreme 
Court. Therefore, in addition to the required formalities, she submitted a 
written application asking the illinois Supreme Court to admit her to the 
bar. 89 She set out a two part argument. First, she noted that she had 
submitted all her qualifications. Consequently, there was only one 
question: "[d]oes being a woman disqualify her under the laws of Illinois 
from receiving a license to practice law?,,90 Bradwell insisted that under 
the statute setting forth the terms of admission, the Illinois legislature 
intended that women be admitted to the bar. Her argument relied on an 
Illinois statute regarding the construction of other statutes. This statute 
provided, "[ w ]hen any party or person is described or referred to by words 
importing the masculine gender, females as well as males shall be deemed 
to be included.,,91 Bradwell insisted that, therefore, a woman should be 
admitted to the bar if she met the qualifications set out in the statute. 
Bradwell quoted sections of the illinois Declaration of Rights to 
illustrate her point. She wrote, for example, if "'all men have a natural 
and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God,' . . . [i]t will not be 
85. Gale, supra note 4, at 1080. She may have begun to study law to assist her husband, 
and then changed plans to open the Chicago Legal News. Frances Olsen reports that many 
women began to appJyJor admission to the bar after the Civil War; having read the law 
to fIll in during the War, H[l]ike Rosie the Riviter [sic], ... many women who filled in at 
'men's jobs' wanted to keep working after the war ended." Olsen, supra note 20, at 1523. 
86. Bradwell v. State, 83 u.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 131 (1873) (No. 73-487). 
87. 2 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 5, 1870, at 145. 
88. 26 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 24, 1894, at 210. 
89. All the information on her application to the illinois court is taken from 2 CHI. 
LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 5, 1870, at 145-47. Subsequent citations are omitted. 
90. Record at 2, Bradwell (No. 73-487). 
91. [d. at 3, citing m. Rev. Stat. ch.90 § 28 (1845). 
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contended that women are not included within this provision.,,92 Bradwell 
argued that any other construction of the statute would place women 
absolutely outside the protection and reach of any of lllinois' laws. She 
insisted that the court was constrained to read the lllinois qualifications for 
attorneys to admit her to the bar. 
On October 7, 1869, Bradwell received a written reply from the court 
r~er. The court denied he!- application OD--the grounds that-a-matl'iOO 
woman could not be bound by the legal and contractual obligations it was 
necessary for an attorney to assume. She was rejected solely due to the 
"DISABILITY IMPOSED BY YOUR MARRIED CONDITION.,,93 The 
court reporter noted that the right to practice law had been denied to people 
under twenty-one years of age as well. Until the legislature removed 
Bradwell's marital disability, the court regarded itself powerless to grant 
her application. 
On November 18, 1869, Bradwell filed an additional brief with the 
COurt.94 First, she insisted "most firmly" that it was not a crime or a 
disqualification under the laws of lllinois to be a married woman.95 She 
then elaborated upon what an attorney was, and who could be one. In 
brief, she argued that attorneys were agents of their clients. Under judicial 
construction of the Married Women's Property Acts, a married woman 
could be an agent of her husband, or act as the agent of another in a 
contract with her husband. Moreover, she noted that even under the 
common law if a married woman represented herself to be a feme sole, she 
rendered herself personally liable on any contract she made. Bradwell 
asked for a new general rule that a married woman could be the same as 
a feme sole for all business purposes. She quoted Lord Mansfield, "the 
times alter new customs and new manners arise, which require new 
exceptions, and a different application of the general rule.,,96 
Bradwell relied heavily on the Married Women's Property Acts. Under 
those acts, women had the power of holding property for their own use, 
and of making legally enforceable contracts necessary or convenient to the 
property's beneficial enjoyment.97 Bradwell contended that if, under the 
1861 Married Women's Property Act, a woman had the power to hire an 
agent, this carried with it the liability to pay the agent a reasonable 
compensation for his services.98 Taken together with the 1869 Act, giving 
92. Id. at 3. 
93. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). 
94. Id. 
95. Bradwell admitted that, in fact, she was a married woman-although that fact had not 
appeared in the record. Id. at 4. Obviously, the members of the court knew her. 
96. Id. at 5. 
97. 2 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 27, 1869, at 68. 
98. Id. 
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the wife her own earnings and the rights to sue for the same in her own 
name, Bradwell argued, a woman had the right to be employed as "an 
agent, or attorney or physician, if she is capable, and [could] agree to do 
the duties of her profession." 99 She insisted that since the passage of the 
1869 Act, a married woman could agree to the duties of any profession and 
was not to be classed with an infant. 100 
Bradwell also argued thatthe-oomt should look at her as an individual, 
not simply as a woman. She had been treated with favor by the Illinois 
Legislature which had granted her feme sole status for her business with the 
Chicago Legal News company. Moreover, the legislature granted her 
newspaper salutary recognition by allowing it to be admitted as evidence 
in the courts of the state. The Illinois Legislature obviously thought 
Bradwell was a capable person; she wanted the Illinois court to take that 
fact into account in considering her application. 
Finally, Bradwell delivered a forceful individualism argument: 
[I]s it for the court to say, in advance, that it will not admit 
a married woman? Should she be admitted, and fail to 
perform her duty, or to comply with all her contracts as an 
attorney, could not the court, upon application, strike her 
name from the roll, or inflict more summary punishment? 
... Not a line of written law, or a single decision in our 
State, can be found disqualifying a married woman from 
acting as an attorney .... [Y]ou, in my judgment, in 
striking me down, strike a blow at the rights of every 
married woman in the great State of Illinois who is 
dependent on her labor for support, and say to her, you 
cannot enter into the smallest contract in relation to your 
earnings or separate property, that can be enforced against 
you in a court of law. . . . This result can, in my opinion, 
only be reached by disregarding the liberal statutes of our 
State, passed for the sole purpose of extending the rights 
of married women, and forever removing from our law, 
relating to their power to contract in regard to their 
earnings and property, the fossil foot-prints of the feudal 
system, and following the strictest rules of the common 
law. 101 
99. [d. at 6. 
100. This may have been Bradwell's first open statement that she intended that a married 
woman's ability to control her own earnings would give her the right to contract to generate 
earnings, and therefore, the right to labor at any profession she chose. This was four years 
before the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129 (Freeman 
1873). 
101. Record at 7-8, Bradwell (No. 73-487). 
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Bradwell's argument unequivocally reveals her stance on women's 
rights. She asked the court to look at her, Myra Bradwell, as an individual. 
She insisted that if the court examined her personal qualifications, separate 
from the fact that she was a woman, that it would have no choice but to 
admit her to the lllinois bar. Her argument underscores the fact that 
Bradwell wanted a vindication of women's rights, and expected a broad 
construction of the Mlu'fiM-Women~suAc1s-tO be a COriierstOneOfiliat 
vindication. She entreated the court to give a broad construction to acts 
which it had previously construed very narrowly. 
Bradwell probably foresaw the lllinois Supreme Court's rejection of all 
her arguments. With this in mind, after she filed her brief, she filed an 
affidavit alleging violations of the Constitution and the Reconstruction Civil 
Rights Act. 102 Bradwell had her eye on the United States Supreme Court. 
In her affidavit, Bradwell argued that under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment she had the "right to exercise and follow the 
profession of an attorney-at-law upon the same terms, conditions and 
restrictions as are applied to every other citizen of the state of lllinois."I03 
Moreover, she insisted, it was contrary to the true intent and meaning of 
the amendment for her to be refused a license based "upon the sole ground 
of her 'married condition ... ,104 
Next, Bradwell declared, "the right to enjoyment of life and liberty, to 
acquire and possess property, to reside in the State, to carry on trade, and 
the right to follow any professional pursuit under the laws of the State, 
which must work equally upon all the citizens of the State,,,105 secured 
the constitutional right to receive a license to practice law upon the same 
terms and conditions as the most favored citizen of the State of lllinois. 
The lllinois court responded that it had no doubts that Bradwell was 
qualified to practice law,l06 but that the Legislature had not made its 
intention clear. Therefore, the court was not in a position to grant a license 
to Bradwell. The court rejected Bradwell's construction of the Married 
Women's Acts. It stated that the 1869 Act was passed after the right to 
102. [d. at 8-9. 
103. [d. at 9. 
104. Bradwell also made some claims based upon her former citizenship in Vermont, and 
her citizenship of the United States. She claimed that these varied citizenships entitled her 
to the "privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." [d. at 9. Katharine 
Bartlett says Bradwell was of the first to "ask the woman question" as to whether the 
privileges and immunities of citizenship for women included the right to practice law. 
Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 839 (1990). The 
"woman question asks about the gender implications of a social practice or rule: have 
women been left out of consideration?" [d. at 837. 
105. Record at 9, Bradwell (No. 73-487). 
106. [d. 
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contract for property was construed into the 1861 ActiO? Therefore, the 
court would not read the right to contract for labor into the Married 
Women's Earnings Act. IOS The court refused to determine how far the 
1869 Act would extend married women's power to contract, since, "after 
further consultation in regard to this application, we find ourselves 
constrained to hold that the sex of the applicant, independently of 
coverture, is. as 001" law ft6W staOOs, a sufficient reason for not granting 
this license."I09 
The court stated: 
[It is not] the province of a court to attempt, by giving a 
new interpretation to an ancient statute, to introduce so 
important a change in the legal position of one-half the 
people. Courts of justice were not intended to be made the 
instruments of pushing forward measures of popular 
reform. llo 
In fairness to the court, it felt constrained by common law canons of 
construction. III In its conclusion, the court observed: 
While those theories which are popularly known as 
"woman's rights" can not be expected to meet with a very 
cordial acceptance among the members of a profession 
which, more than any other, inclines its followers, if not to 
stand immovable upon the ancient ways, at least to make 
no hot haste in measures of reform, still all right-minded 
107. 2 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 5, 1870, at 146-47. 
108. Apparently the court would not be ready to take this action for another four years. 
See Martin v. Robson, 65 lll. at 129. By that time, Bradwell's case had already made it to 
the Supreme Court and women had gained the right to practice law in Illinois. See infra, 
note 133 and accompanying text. 
109. Record at 10, Bradwell (No. 73-487). 
110. [d. at 12. 
111. This is consistent with judicial behavior of the time. In the nineteenth century, the 
judiciary was supposed to take a passive, not an active stance-at least in social matters. 
Gilliam, supra note 4, at 112 (citing G.E. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PuBLIC LIFE 351-57 
(1982)). The court also rejected Bradwell's argument for construction of the statute in light 
of the legislature'S rule of construction to include women. Revised Stat., 1845, ch.9O § 28. 
The court pointed to another statute which provided that "this rule of construction shall not 
apply where there is anything in the subject or context repugnant to such construction." 
Revised Stat., 1845, ch. 90 § 36. The court certainly felt that admitting Bradwell to the 
practice of law would have been repugnant to the meaning of the statute. Olsen calls the 
court's approach "footdragging". She points out that women's common law disabilities 
were judge-made and could be judge-broken. Olsen, supra note 20, at 1531, 1533. 
However, judging from the conservative legal atmosphere, and the fact that the legislatures 
were already changing the laws through the Married Women's Property Acts, Olsen's 
argument seems ahistorical. 
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men must gladly see new spheres of action opened to 
women.ll2 
197 
Although the decision of the lllinois Supreme Court in Bradwell's case 
was consistent with its construction of the Married Women's Property Act 
and the common law, Bradwell could well have expected a more judicious 
construction considering the recent developments in the 1861 law, as well 
$ her favorable individual treatment beforethe legislalm e~ Unfortunately, 
the court refused to look beyond the implications of granting a woman 
admission. It would not admit Bradwell on the basis of her own qualifica-
tions. Unquestionably, the court admitted that she was capable enough for 
admission. Her admission was automatically disallowed solely because she 
was a woman. 
The court's decision was a minor setback for Bradwell. Her next step 
was the United States Supreme Court. Toward that end, Bradwell retained 
Wisconsin Senator Matthew Hale Carpenter. Carpenter was one of the 
more famous attorneys of the time, an acknowledged authority on 
constitutional issues who had publicly supported woman suffrage. 113 
From the time she retained him, Bradwell gave control of the case to 
Carpenter. Carpenter sent Bradwell a copy of the brief only after he 
submitted it to the court. The brief appears to have been hastily written, 
and was logically unpersuasive. 114 
The most important and innovative part of Carpenter's argument, like 
Bradwell's addition to her lllinois brief, rested on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Carpenter argued that women were included in the Fourteenth 
Amendment declaration, "all persons born and naturalized in the United 
States . . . are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they 
reside."llS Although he conceded for the sake of argument that the right 
to vote was not one of the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment,116 the question remained whether denying 
admission to the bar to a properly qualified person would violate the 
privileges and immunities clause. The privileges of American citizenship 
included, "Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and, in the pursuit of 
112. Record at 13, Bradwell (No. 73-487). 
113. Gilliam, supra note 4, at 116. 
114. [d. at 119. It appears that, contrary to his standard practice, Carpenter spent little 
time going over the brief. Moreover, at that time, the percentage of Carpenter's winning 
cases was rather low. In the term that Bradwell's case came before the Court, Carpenter 
lost eight of the ten cases he argued before the Court. [d. at 123. Carpenter's argument 
may also have been logically unpersuasive because the same day he argued Bradwell's case, 
he argued the winning side in the Slaughterhouse Cases. [d. at 124. Bradwell, however, 
called Carpenter's brief a "concise, able and unanswerable argument." 4 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, 
Jan. 20, 1872 at 108. 
115. Appellant's Brief at 3, Bradwell (No. 73-487). 
116. [d. at 4. 
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happiness, all avocations, all honors, all positions are alike open to every 
one; and in the protection of these rights all are equal before the law."l17 
Carpenter challenged: 
[if the privileges and immunities clause did] not open all 
the professions all the avocations, all the methods by 
which a man may pursue happiness, to the colored as well 
as tfte wmtelBaa;lfien-me~of-me--statesmay -
exclude colored men from all the honorable pursuits of 
life, and compel them to support their existence in a 
condition of servitude. And if this provision does protect 
the colored citizen, then it protects every citizen, black or 
white, male or female. lI8 
In a vein similar to Bradwell's brief before the illinois court, Carpenter 
stated, "It is provided that citizens may be disfranchised for treason; but it 
is nowhere provided that a citizen shall be disfranchised for being a 
married woman."lI9 
Perhaps to gain the sympathy of the justices, Carpenter then used an 
approach similar to Bradwell's "sympathy" campaign - the first stage-
for the Married Women's Earnings Act: 
There may be cases in which a client's rights can only be 
rescued by an exercise of the rough qualities possessed by 
men. There are many causes in which the telling sympa-
thy and the silver voice of woman would accomplish more 
than the severity and sternness of man could achieve. Of 
a bar composed of men and women of equal integrity and 
learning, women might be more or less frequently retained, 
as the taste or judgment of clients might dictate. But the 
broad shield of the Constitution is over them all, and 
protects each in that measure of success which his or her 
individual merits may secure.J20 
Although Carpenter began with an appeal to the possible success 
women would have due solely to their femininity, his conclusion vindicated 
Bradwell's individual rights position. 
117. Id. at 8. 
118. Id. at 10. 
119. Id. at 11. Today the word disfranchised is associated mainly with the vote. Its 
broader definition, however, is ''to be deprived of a legal right." Of course, the common 
law deprived women citizens of many legal rights solely on the basis of the fact that they 
were women. 
120. Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
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In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court rejected Carpenter's argu-
ments. 121 The Bradwell decision is usually referred to as a "practical 
application" of the Slaughterhouse Cases philosophy.122 In the Slaughter-
house Cases, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment merely forbade 
state infringement of the rights of national citizenship.123 Under the 
federal Constitution, the rights of state citizenship could still be infringed 
upon llY the states. 
Due to the inconsistencies of the concurring opinions in Bradwell's 
case from the justices who had dissented from the Slaughterhouse Cases, 
it is clear that sex discrimination was also a major factor in Bradwell's 
case. The Slaughterhouse decision only made it easier for the court to 
reach the decision that it did. For example, in his famous concurring 
opinion, Justice Bradley made absolutely no reference to any law except 
"the law of the creator" as interpreted by the "founders of the common 
law": 
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill 
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is 
the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must 
be adapted to the general constitution of things, and things 
cannot be based upon exceptional cases. 124 
Bradley's concurrence essentially said that women are delicate, timid, 
and dependent. 125 They would fulfill their destiny in the home. Women 
were unsuited for independent active lives in the public sphere. Obviously, 
Bradley was not personally acquainted with Myra Bradwell. Even if he 
had been, it may not have mattered because she was only an "exceptional 
case" in the category of all women. 126 
While Bradwell applauded Justice Miller's majority opinion for at least 
confining itself to the points at issue without going out of the record to 
give his individual views on women's rights, she deplored the fact that 
121. There is no dissenting opinion from Chief Justice Chase (who, it is interesting to 
note, was related to Bradwell on her mother's side). He died three weeks after the decision 
was handed down. Chase dissented in the Slaughterhouse Cases as well. See Spector, 
supra note 4, at 237. 
122. Gilliam, supra note 4, at 117 (citing Charles Warren, 2 THE SUPREME COURT IN 
UNITED STATES HISTORY 550 (1928». See also Olsen, supra note 20, at 1526-28. 
123. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74-79 (1873). 
124. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J. concurring). 
125. KARST, supra note 6 at 105-1(>6. See also Kenneth Karst, Woman's Constitution, 
1984 DUKE L.J. 447,451 (1984). 
126. Frances Olsen describes the Bradwell decision as an instance of false paternalism, 
mentioned briefly, supra note 20 and accompanying text. Olsen points out that Justice 
Bradley used women's "exalted" role to keep women in a subordinate position: "Bradley 
favored overruling Bradwell's choice not for her sake but rather to advance other goals." 
Olsen, supra note 20, at 1532. 
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"[w]e applied ... [and were turned down] on the sole ground that we were 
a woman.,,127 Bradwell declared that she had tried to insure the liberty 
of pursuit which was guaranteed to every citizen by the Fourteenth 
Amendment under laws which should operate equally upon all. 128 She 
had hoped to demonstrate in taking the case to the Supreme Court that 
"women have some rights and privileges as citizens of the United States 
which are L~ by t!le [F}ourteel!tb [A]mendment."I29 
Bradwell had not been waiting idly for the-Coun's decision. while the 
case was under consideration, Bradwell and Alta Hulett, who became the 
first woman admitted to the Illinois bar, lobbied a bill through the Illinois 
legislature which would bar discrimination in employment. l3O Bradwell 
stated that she may not have had success before the Court, but she was 
more than compensated in seeing that as a result of her agitation, statutes 
had been passed in several states including Wyoming, Utah, Missouri, 
Iowa, Ohio, and the District of Columbia. 131 This made it clear that 
Bradwell was concerned about more than her own ability to practice law. 
Without the anti-discrimination statute, the court may not have construed 
the 1869 Act to have given women the right to labor to acquire earnings, 
to take care of themselves and their families. 
One author says, in an article about Bradwell's case, that Bradwell did 
not pursue her claim after the Supreme Court rejected her because she 
would not beg for rights: "[p ]rinciple, more than a lack of free time, 
dictated her decision not to bring the matter before the Supreme Court 
again.,,132 This is not entirely true. Once Bradwell and Hulett's statute 
passed the legislature, Bradwell did not apply for admission to the bar. 133 
Bradwell was not as interested in practicing law as she was in advancing 
the cause of women's rights. She had accomplished some of her goals 
simply by putting the issue out for consideration, and seeing statutes passed 
to allow women to practice law in illinois and in other states. Although 
she could not convince the courts to alter their antiquated common law 
path, Bradwell struck a blow for women's rights in the legislatures and in 
127. 5 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, April 19, 1873, at 354. 
128. Record at 8-9 Bradwell (No. 73-487). 
129. [d. Of course, that struggle continues in the women's rights movement to the present 
day. 
130. Wheeler, supra note 24, at 53. The law read: 
[N]o person shall be precluded or debarred from any occupation, profession or 
employment ... on account of sex; Provided, that this act shall not be construed 
to affect the eligibility of any person to an elective office. 
Stat. of lll. ch. 48 § 3 (Hurd 1874),5 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, April 19, 1873, at 354. 
131. 5 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, April 19, 1873, at 354 (all now repealed). 
132. Gilliam, supra note 4, at 128. 
133. The lllinois bar later admitted her on its own motion. 26 Cill. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 
24, 1894, at 210. 
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the history books. Unfortunately, Bradwell's blow was not strong enough 
to reach her end goal of suffrage. 
III. THE BLURRY LINE BETWEEN CIVIL AND POLmCAL 
RIGHTS 
Bradwell wanted equal rights for women. She was willing to gain 
rights- through step-by-step ''reforms'' Qf through exercising the baIlgt,-but 
she would not be satisfied with having either "civil" or "political" rights 
but not both. Historically, the rights accompanying control over earnings 
and practicing law had implications outside the "civil" rights context. 
Property ownership had been a traditional prerequisite for voting. Later, 
the focus shifted to control of one's own labor. Both of these qualifications 
were related to married women's control of their own earnings. Similarly, 
attorneys were traditionally regarded as officers of the court, a semi-public 
service office which practically carried with it a presumption of political 
ability. 
Although Bradwell never stated it in her arguments for "civil" rights 
reforms, when examined through the lens of her woman suffrage advocacy, 
the "civil" rights she secured had clear "political" rights implications that 
Bradwell was well aware of. Bradwell did not make her arguments for 
married women's earnings in conjunction with arguments for woman 
suffrage, but the intersection of the two is clear in an historical context and 
in Bradwell's woman suffrage writing. 
The American colonists inherited the British tradition of using property 
ownership as a qualification for voting. 134 In Britain, this practice arose 
from the idea that so long as the landowners directly paid the bulk of 
public taxes, it was fair to confine Commons' elections to landowners. 13S 
Blackstone argued that a property qualification was necessary because those 
who did not own property had "no will of their own"; they were under the 
control of their landlords. 136 The egalitarian rhetoric of the American 
Revolution and the levelling that occurred after the War forced Americans 
to re-examine property qualifications and led many states to adopt 
taxpaying qualifications instead. 137 
Even after property qualifications were abolished, voting requirements 
still incorporated the Blackstonian notion that a voter had to have a will of 
his own. The new qualifications only redefined which individuals were in 
134. CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY: 
1760-1860 3 (1960). 
135. [d. at 6. 
136. [d. at 11; see also Robert Steinfeld, Property and SUffrage in the Early American 
Republic, 41 STAN. L. REv. 335, 340 (1989). 
137. Williamson, supra note 134, at 92-207. The force of Revolutionary rhetoric was not 
powerful enough to compel all sates to change property qualifications. 
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control of their wills. Citizens who earned wages for their labor came to 
be considered independent. 138 Paupers and women were excluded from 
suffrage because they were all considered dependent on others.139 
The relation between property, labor control, independence, and 
suffrage were clear in Bradwell's work for married women's earnings. In 
one issue, Bradwell presented a simple and straightforward historical 
argument that once women gained full property rights they should have the 
nglif to vote: -- - -
Every citizen who owns and controls property in his or 
her own right, not being subject to any disability, should 
have the right to assist in making the laws that regulate the 
sale of such property, and the taxation imposed thereon, 
without regard to whether such person is male or female. 
The law in regard to the person and property of women 
has been changed much, within a few centuries-from a 
mere slave that could own no property, or make a valid 
contract without the consent of her husband, the aid of a 
court of the intervention of a trustee. . . she has become a 
person capable of owning property and controlling it, free 
from the interference of her husband. . . . 
There is now a necessity, when woman is clothed with 
all these responsibilities and privileges, that she should 
have a voice in the government, and be allowed to vote. l40 
Bradwell believed that as women's property rights had evolved, women 
should have gained the right to vote. 
In another issue of the News, Bradwell presented the resolutions of the 
New Hampshire woman suffrage convention. These resolutions declared, 
"taxation without representation is tyranny.,,141 It was unfair for women 
to be taxed for earnings and property by legislators women had not helped 
to select. Bradwell placed a brief comment on married women's earnings 
after the New Hampshire resolutions: "[i]n New Hampshire, married 
women have the right to collect their own earnings. We hope, before the 
138. Steinfeld, supra note 136, at 361-64, 375. 
139. [d. at 375. Rowland Berthoff, Conventional Mentality: Free Blacks, Women, and 
Business Corporations as Unequal Persons, 1820-1870, 76 J. AM. RIST. 753, 760 (1989). 
Those who opposed woman suffrage adhered to the ideal that the man voted for the family 
as a unit. White men trusted that their wives were content to go on in the home. [d. at 
784. 
140. I CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 7, 1868, at 45. 
141. 1 Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 9, 1869, at 117. 
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adjournment of the present legislature, they will have that right in lllinoiS.,,142 
The right to earnings was an important "civil" right, but was more 
important as a part of the end goal of autonomy. Before married women 
could be individual agents, they had to have complete control over their 
labor and their property. Women in Illinois could not make the same broad 
claims to suffrage as the women in New Hampshire until they had full 
authority over aU their property, iIlcluding tlleir~gs. As Bradwellhad 
stated in her application to practice law, control over earnings also gave 
women the right to contract to labor. 143 This complete independence 
should have guaranteed women's right to vote. 
Unfortunately, Bradwell's Married Women's Earnings Act could not 
increase the status of women as far toward full autonomy as she may have 
needed in order to compel the autonomy-suffrage conclusion. The Act 
specifically provided, "this act shall not be construed to give to the wife 
any right to compensation for any labor performed for her minor children 
or husband."I44 This provision was rooted in the idea that a husband was 
entitled to his wife's labor in the home. 14s This form of entitlement 
could only continue women's subordination to their husbands. It would 
also bolster the anti-suffragists' arguments that the husband, as head of the 
family, voted for the interests of the entire family, including the wife. l46 
The ties of a "civil" right to practice law and the "political" right to 
vote may have been even closer than property ownership and control and 
the right to vote. First, as noted above, the right to practice law or any 
occupation was tied up with the rights of citizenship. This was the basis 
of Bradwell's lawsuit. As Bradwell demanded when she published 
Carpenter's brief, "[olne half the citizens of the United States are 
asking-Is the liberty of pursuit guaranteed to us, or are we slavesT147 
If women could not practice law or choose any calling, they were deprived 
of significant rights of citizenship. Citizens who could not choose their 
occupation were certainly not autonomous enough to vote. 
Second, the character of the legal profession historically had "political" 
rights implications. Under English law as adopted in America, an attorney 
was (and still is) considered an "officer of the court.,,148 In England, 
142. [d. 
143. 2 CHI. LEGAL NEWS. Feb. 5, 1870, at 146-147. 
144. [d. 
145. Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age 
of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HrsT. 471, 482 (1988). 
146. See Berthoff, supra note 139, at 760; AILEEN KRAoITOR, IDEAS OF THE WOMAN 
SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-192025 (1965). 
147. 4 Cill. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 20, 1872, at 108. 
148. Robert J. Martineau, The Attorney As An Officer of the Court: Time to Take the Gown 
Off the Bar, 35 S. C. L. REv. 541, 547 (1984). The idea that an attorney was an officer of 
a court was ftrst adopted in a watered down manner in the United States in 1810. At this 
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attorneys were called officers of the court because most of them had some 
independent official status, such as that of clerk of the court or an under-
sheriff. 149 That status not only made them subject to regulation by the 
court but also gave them certain privileges. ISO As an officer of the court, 
an attorney held a semi-public office which could also have been 
considered "political." In 1876, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that 
if attorneys were officezs of thecourtlheaJlli~)'_were "certainly, in some 
sense, officers of the state for which the court acts."m The court 
continued, "attorneys and counselors of a court, though not properly public 
officers, are quasi officers of the state whose justice is administered by the 
COurt."IS2 
In 1867, the United States Supreme Court announced that attorneys 
were "officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of 
their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character.",s3 
The court emphasized that to be an attorney was not a mere profession. 
The right to practice law was "more than a mere indulgence, revocable at 
the pleasure of the court or command of the legislature.,,'54 An attorney 
could be removed only for "moral or professional delinquency."'ss The 
legislature could prescribe qualifications for attorneys as it could for any 
profession, but only the Court had the power to remove attorneys.IS6 
time, the Virginia court announced that an attorney's position is similar to that of a juror 
(a "political" right), who also has responsibilities and duties to execute faithfully. [d. at 
549. 
149. [d. at 541. 
150. [d. 
151. In the Matter of the Motion to Admit Ole Mosness, Esq., 39 Wis. 509, 510 (1876). 
152. [d. (emphasis in original). 
153. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1867). 
154. [d. at 379. 
155. [d. Garland was a Confederate Senator whom Congress disqualified from practicing 
law after the Civil War. In Ex Parte Garland, the Supreme Court said that the loyalty oath 
required by Congress after Garland was pardoned by the President was an ex post facto law; 
Congress could not deprive him of the right to practice law. Interestingly enough, Matthew 
Carpenter helped argue the case for the petitioner, Garland. Although Garland won, his 
argument did not focus on the position of an attorney as officer of the court. Garland's 
arguments focused on Constitutional prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto 
laws. [d. at 340. Garland's attorneys also focused on attorneys as a "class," necessary "for 
the protection of the citizen." [d. at 370. In Bradwell's case, Carpenter cited Garland for 
the proposition that the profession of law is open to every citizen of the United States. 4 
Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 20, 1872, at 109. 
156. [d. at 109 (citing Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9 (1857)). The United States argued 
that Congress had decided the qualifications for admission to the Supreme Court bar, and 
therefore had given Garland the right to practice. Now, Congress could take that right 
away. The Court said that an attorney is not like an office created by Congress which 
depends upon the will of Congress for its continuance. Mississippi, for example, had held 
that once the attorney was admitted to the bar, he had a property right to practice law. Ex 
parte Heyfron, 8 Miss. (7 How.) 127 (1843). 
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The fact that there was controversy over who could remove an attorney 
and what role an attorney played in the government and the society shows 
that there was a tenuous line between whether an attorney was a public 
official or simply a professional. 
Bradwell and the lllinois Supreme Court were well aware of the officer 
of the court doctrine. The lllinois Supreme Court in Bradwell's case stated 
that an attorney is ~_ "~of the_ oowt. • ~. !Ie is appointed to assist 
in the administration of justice, is required to take an oath of office, and is 
privileged from arrest while attending COurts."IS7 The court relied on the 
fact that there were no woman attorneys in England and that if women 
were allowed to practice law, "every civil office in this State may be filled 
by women ... that women should be made governors, judges and 
sheriffs."ls8 The court was unwilling to admit Bradwell to be an officer 
of the court because that would have meant they had to admit her to any 
office in the state, including public and possibly political offices. 
The wording of the non-discrimination statute that Bradwell and Hulett 
lobbied while Bradwell's case was pending before the Supreme Court 
illustrates that the line between "civil" and "political" rights was blurred 
where occupations such as the practice of law were concerned. The 
legislature wanted to insure that just because women could hold any 
occupation they could not hold any public office or gamer any "political" 
rights. The statute specifically provided, "this act shall not be construed to 
affect the eligibility of any person to an elective office."IS9 The 
legislature and the courts held any role in government strictly off limits to 
women. 
The fact that the women's movement viewed Bradwell's lawsuit as an 
important attempt for the political rights of women illustrates that the right 
to practice law was closely tied to suffrage. l60 As a Constitutional case, 
Bradwell's suit was the first of the "New Departure" cases brought by 
women active in the women's rights movement. The New Departure took 
the stand that women "had merely to take a right that was already 
theirs."161 After they were excluded by the framers of the Reconstruction 
amendments, suffragists saw that the traditional methods to getting their 
157. 2 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 5, 1870, at 147. In Re Bradwell, 55 lli. 535, 537. 
158. [d. at 539-540. 
159. Stat. of lli. ch. 48 § 3 (Hurd 1874), 5 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, April 19, 1873, at 354. 
160. Stanton et aI., supra note 23, at 601. Bradwell's approach helped start the New 
Departure era, and was part of the upsurge in women's rights activism after the Reconstruc-
tion amendments. Bradwell's application for admission to the lliinois bar coincided with 
the application of seven women for admission to the Iowa and lllinois bars or enrollment 
in northwestern law schools. Gilliam, supra note 4, at 107. Although there is no evidence 
that these women worked in concert, it is clear that their actions were part of a new method 
of attacking restrictions on women's independence. 
161. DuBois, Compact of the Fathers, supra note 2, at 852-53. 
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rights recognized by amending the Constitution had failed. Therefore, they 
began to seek new avenues in the courts by attempting to get their rights 
read into the Constitution. Suffragists viewed Bradwell's case as a test 
suit to help determine judicial responsiveness to women's right to vote 
under existing laws because it pushed an interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment which could have given women the right to vote. 162 
Bra(l\'lell's suit made it-tcLthe Supreme Court.llYQ sears ~Qfe the.1!lOSt 
famous New Departure suit: Virginia Minor's claim that women had the 
right of suffrage already granted in the Constitution. 163 
Carpenter's argument before the Supreme Court supports the proposi-
tion that Bradwell's case pushed an interpretation sympathetic to woman 
suffrage. After explaining the background of the case, Carpenter attempted 
to "quiet the fears of the timid and conservative."I64 He proceeded 
carefully to distinguish the right of woman suffrage from the right Bradwell 
was requesting. He specifically declared that the practice of law was one 
of a citizen's "privileges or immunities;" suffrage was a question of man's 
rights. 165 Carpenter said he had faith in female suffrage to reform the 
election system: 
If our wives, sisters and daughters were going to the polls, 
we should go with them, and good order would be ob-
served or a row would follow, which would secure order 
in the future. . . . Who believes that if ladies were admitted 
to seats in Congress, or upon the bench, or were participat-
ing in discussions at the bar, such proceedings would 
thereby be rendered less refined, or that less regard would 
be paid to the rights of al1?l66 
Nevertheless, Carpenter argued that the question of woman suffrage 
was settled by the exclusion of women from the Fifteenth Amendment. 167 
The close connection between practicing law, holding political office, and 
voting was very clear in Carpenter's brief. His effort to distinguish 
suffrage from the right to practice law demonstrates that the right to vote 
could follow closely on the heels of gaining admission to the bar. 
Bradwell's response to the lllinois Supreme Court's decision was 
probably the best summary of the connection between the "civil" right to 
practice law and the "political" right of suffrage. She declared, "what the 
162. Stanton et al., supra note 23 at 615. 
163. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). 
164. 4 CIn. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 20, 1872, at 109. Earlier in the brief, Carpenter called the 
right to practice law a "civil" right. [d. at 108. 
165. [d. 
166. [d. at 108. 
167. Stanton et al., supra note 23 at 615-616. 
Summer 1993] CIVIL RIGHTS AND SUFFRAGE 207 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dred Scott case 
was to the rights of negroes as citizens of the United States, this decision 
is to the political rights of women in lllinois-annihilation."I68 Bradwell 
knew that if she could not get admitted to the bar in lllinois, she would 
also not be able to gain the right to vote in lliinois. First, because it would 
be a symbol of the lack of autonomy; second, because the right to practice 
law .1lad. SllCh gr~"PQlitical" implications. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Myra Bradwell was an important representative of the lliinois and 
National Woman Suffrage Association positions. Her career serves as a 
perfect illustration of the problems and barriers women faced in the 1870's 
and, to a lesser extent, still face today. Her unique circumstances placed 
her in an influential position. As the wife of a powerful man who 
supported women's rights, Bradwell was able to mount a fight for women's 
rights in an age when married women were only slowly emerging from the 
constraining arm of coverture. As the publisher of an influential legal 
newspaper, Bradwell had a forum to gain the ear of the legal community. 
As a woman with connections in the legislature, she could successfully 
lobby for women's rights issues. 169 Bradwell combined these special 
circumstances with her considerable abilities and tried to make a real 
difference in women's status in lllinois and across the country. While 
Bradwell gained some ground for women, she was unable to break down 
the barrier between "civil" and "political" rights to gain the full equality 
she sought. 
Bradwell argued for the Married Women's Earnings Act because 
property rights and the right to control labor were inherent rights of 
citizenship and conventional symbols of autonomy. As citizens, women's 
property could not be taken without consent or due process of law. 
Bradwell knew, however, that the Act was only a step toward control over 
property. Suffrage was the only form of organized political consent. If 
women had property which could be taxed, then they must have the vote 
to insure that property remained secure. 
Bradwell pushed her application to the lliinois bar through to try to 
determine the extent to which women were considered citizens under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. If women could be denied the right to choose 
whatever job they wanted, then obviously, women were not full citizens. 
168. 2 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 5, 1870, at 147 (emphasis added). Although it is possible 
to argue that this statement means that the definition of an attorney's position placed 
practicing law in the realm of "political" rights, it is clear from the context that practicing 
law was a "civil" right, a step to "political" rights. 
169. This article did not begin to cover the other smaller measures Bradwell pushed 
through the legislature to improve married women's status during and after marriage. 
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It was only through the Slaughterhouse Cases' artful reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that the Supreme Court could dodge Bradwell's 
argument. The right to practice law also had powerful "political" 
implications. If Bradwell had been able on the basis of her privileges and 
immunities arguments to become an officer of the court, she could have 
stood on more solid ground for gaining suffrage. Although she obtained 
an anti discrimination statute, the disqualification from p9lit~al 9fflCeS 
weakened Bradwell's hope for connecting admission to the bar and 
suffrage. 
On the whole, women's attainment of rights in marriage, property and 
children may have been more important than the right to vote. Without 
attaining financial and legal independence within the home, women could 
not have gone out to achieve professional and "political" rights outside 
it. 170 In the end, the distinction between "civil" and "political" rights 
may have been part of the conventional thinking of the day, but it had no 
acceptable applications for women's rights activists. Women like Myra 
Bradwell were not willing to accept one type of right or another. 171 
Women in the movement wanted to be treated as individuals, and as equal 
citizens on all levels. 
170. Elizabeth Cady Stanton wrote that in New York, the Married Women's Property Acts 
had a great effect on the women's rights movement generally. Peggy A. Rabkin, The 
Origins of Law Reform: The Social Significance of the Nineteenth Century Codification 
Movements and Its Contribution to the Passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, 24 
BUFF. L. REv. 683, 755 (1975). See also, ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING 
LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN, ii (1960). 
171. Aileen Kraditor posits that, for Elizabeth Cady Stanton, suffrage was just one means 
to the end of equal rights, but Susan B. Anthony decided suffrage was the one cause to 
which she should devote her life. Kraditor, supra note 146, at 10-11. This implies that 
Susan B. Anthony did not care for other rights or that Anthony did not advocate other 
women's rights reforms. This is not true; Anthony worked for the overall goal of women's 
rights just as Stanton did. Anthony once said that she became a "woman's rights woman" 
when she discovered that "no married woman had any legal right, even to the fifty cents she 
earned over the wash-tub." Stanley, supra note 145, at 483 (quoting Revolution, Sept. 24, 
1868). Perhaps suffrage seemed like the best way to secure all other rights, but Anthony 
did not ignore civil rights reforms. 
